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ABSTRACT 
This study adopts a power perspective to investigate sustainable supply chain relationships 
and specifically uses resource dependence theory (RDT) to critically analyze buyer–supplier–
supplier relationships. Empirical evidence is provided, extending the RDT model in this 
context. The concept of power relationships is explored through a qualitative study of a 
multinational company and agricultural growers in the UK food industry that work together to 
implement sustainable practices. We look at multiple triadic relationships involving a large 
buyer and its small suppliers to investigate how relative power affects the implementation of 
sustainable supply-management practices. The study highlights that power as dependence is 
relevant to understanding compliance in sustainable supply chains and to identifying 
appropriate relationship-management strategies to build more sustainable supply chains. We 
show the influences of power on how players manage their relationships and how it affects 
organizational responses to the implementation of sustainability initiatives. Power notably 
influences the sharing of sustainability-related risks and value between supply chain partners. 
From a managerial perspective, the study contributes to developing a better understanding of 
how power can become an effective way to achieve sustainability goals. This paper offers 
insights into the way in which a large organization works with small and medium size 
enterprises (SMEs) to implement sustainable practices and shows how power management—
that is, the way in which power is used—can support or hinder effective cooperation around 
sustainability in the supply chain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With growing concerns over the sustainability and ethicality of business practices, supply 
chain relationships have become even more critical. Companies face increasing pressure to 
account for the malpractices of their suppliers and sometimes their suppliers’ suppliers. This 
idea of “boundaryless responsibility” (Amaeshi, Osuji, & Nnodim, 2008) means that 
companies need to consider how they can achieve economic, social, and environmental goals 
through their entire supply chain (SC). Firms are challenged with managing their SC 
relationships in order to mitigate the reputational and operational risks that can emerge from 
unethical and unsustainable practices (Krause, Vachon, & Klassen, 2009). The depth and 
quality of the relationship between a firm and its suppliers was the most commonly cited 
facilitator of sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) (Brammer, Hoejmose, & 
Millington, 2011). Surveys of business executives reveal that SSCM is of critical importance 
in managers’ agendas (Anonymous, 2010; Haanaes et al., 2011; Hopkins, 2009; Kiron, 
Kruschwitz, Haanaes, & von Streng Velken, 2012). Hence, the importance of developing 
knowledge around what constitutes efficient relationship-management strategies for 
sustainability. 
In this manuscript, we use Carter and Rogers’s (2008) definition of SSCM as “the 
strategic, transparent integration, and achievement of an organization’s social, environmental, 
and economic goals in the systemic coordination of key interorganizational business 
processes for improving the long-term economic performance of the individual company and 
its supply chains” (2008: 368). Their definition builds upon the triple-bottom-line view of 
sustainability (Elkington, 1998), which conceptualizes organizational performance as the 
management of not only economic but also environmental and social capital. This definition 
is also consistent with the argument that SSCM is a key relational capability (A. Paulraj, 
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2011). It is necessary to understand relational antecedents and their impact on SSCM in order 
to fully comprehend how long-term sustainability performance may be achieved.  
Previous research has put a strong emphasis on collaboration between SC partners to 
facilitate sustainability initiatives (e.g. Gold, Seuring, & Beske, 2010; Seuring & Müller, 
2008). Several studies by Klassen and Vachon (Klassen & Vachon, 2003; 2006, 2008; 2006; 
2007; 2008) consider green supply chains (SC) and have shown that collaborative green 
practices and integration with suppliers were associated with higher performance. Other 
studies by Verghese and Lewis (2007) and Rao (2004) add further supporting evidence that 
SC partnerships and integration enhance environmental innovation and the greening of the 
production process. Improved trust as a result of SC collaboration enhances SSC performance 
through knowledge sharing and communication (Alvarez, Pilbeam, & Wilding, 2010; Cheng, 
Yeh, & Tu, 2008). Cooperation with suppliers has become viewed as a critical component of 
creating sustainable SCs (Pagell & Wu, 2009). 
In this study, we deviate from previous studies emphasizing collaboration by 
considering the importance of power differentials between supply chain members in 
achieving triple-bottom-line goals. In traditional SC literature, a significant amount of 
research has looked at the concept of power in buyer–supplier exchange (e.g. Benton & 
Maloni, 2005; Cox, 2004a; Meehan & Wright, 2012; Oliver, 1990). These studies share the 
view that power dynamics are central to understanding supply relationship-management 
practices. Terpend and Ashenbaum (2012) have shown that power affects different aspects of 
industrial relationships including trust, conflict levels, collaboration, commitment, and 
satisfaction. The role that power plays in buyer–supplier relationships is often perceived as 
being negative (Caniëls & Gelderman, 2007; Nair, Narasimhan, & Bendoly, 2011). When 
considering the shift from SCM to SSCM, relationship-management strategies may 
significantly change to accommodate the goals of sustainability with, for example, dominant 
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buyers not exploiting their power over dependent suppliers but rather treating them like 
strategic partners (Pagell, Wu, & Wasserman, 2010). 
There is little research challenging the collaborative paradigm in SSCM, and power 
relationships remain underexplored (Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012; Helen Walker, 
Miemczyk, Johnsen, & Spencer, 2012). This is surprising given that most research in the field 
considers the activities of large corporations often working with small suppliers at home or 
overseas to implement sustainable practices (Amaeshi, et al., 2008; Jeremy Hall, 2001; Lee & 
Klassen, 2008; H. Walker & Preuss, 2008). Arguably many case studies presented in the 
SSCM literature display some sort of power imbalance, which will not only determine who 
drives the agenda but also influence the implementation and outcomes of sustainability 
initiatives (Boyd, Spekman, Kamauff, & Werhane, 2007; Jeremy Hall, 2001; Millington, 
2008; E.R. Pedersen & Andersen, 2006). Power inequalities are likely to influence the 
development of trust in relationships and, more generally, alter the dynamics of the exchange 
(Stephens, Fulk, & Monge, 2009) 
In this paper, we adopt a power perspective to better understand how such imbalanced 
relationships are managed in sustainable SCs. We draw upon resource dependence theory 
(RDT) and analyze the vertical relationships between a large buyer and its small suppliers and 
the horizontal relationships among these suppliers, working together to implement 
sustainability practices. Our study addresses the following research questions: 
How do imbalanced SC power relationships affect the implementation of SSCM? 
a. Does power imbalance act as a driver or barrier to SSCM? 
b. How does the power differential influence the management of sustainability practices 
among the buyer and its suppliers? 
We therefore make four main contributions. First, we make an original contribution to 
the field by offering an alternative view to the widely adopted collaborative paradigm and 
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respond to calls for researching how power imbalance between buyer and supplier affects 
sustainability practice (Pullman, Maloni, & Carter, 2009). Second, we provide practical 
insights about how relative power and dependence impact the management of 
interorganizational processes for implementing sustainability practices (Sarkis, Zhu, & Lai, 
2011). Third, our application of RDT to investigate SSCM practices is a response to calls for 
more theoretically grounded research in the field. Most SSCM studies fail to employ any 
theoretical lens (55% according to Carter & Easton, 2011) and remain largely descriptive 
(Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby, 2012; Helen Walker, et al., 2012). The theoretical contribution of 
our research goes beyond the traditional focal-firm perspective adopted in SSCM (Carter & 
Easton, 2011; Carter & Rogers, 2008) to encompass buyer–supplier–supplier relations. 
Fourth, we specifically address the concerns about the need to increase the application of 
RDT to study buyer–supplier relationships (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005), and specifically in 
SSCM (Carter & Easton, 2011; Carter & Rogers, 2008). RDT has been previously identified 
as relevant but relatively underutilized (Sarkis, et al., 2011).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We start by presenting the 
theoretical foundation to our study through a discussion of the concept of power in SCs and 
explain our rationale for focusing on RDT and its relevance to SSCM. We then discuss the 
methodology adopted and present our findings regarding power/dependence and relationship 
management. Finally, we discuss our findings and their implications and draw conclusions. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
Many conceptualizations of power exist in the literature (Chicksand, 2009; Ireland & Webb, 
2007), in particular how power is exerted in organizations (Hardy & Clegg, 1996; Marx, 
1976; Thomas, Sargent, & Hardy, 2010; Weber, 1978). Research has focused on sources of 
power (French & Raven, 1959), and whether power is mediated or not  (Benton & Maloni, 
2005; M. Maloni & Benton, 2000). Provan (1980) distinguishes between potential and 
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enacted power emerging from the dependencies between individuals and organizations. In 
considering the link between power and dependence in interorganizational relations (Gaski, 
1984; Handley & Benton, 2012), we specifically adopt RDT, which has evolved from the 
organizational power literature. From this theoretical perspective, the ability to influence 
another firm’s behavior (i.e., power) requires this firm to have control over certain resources 
on which the other firm is dependent (Cox, 2007). 
Power: A Resource Dependence Perspective 
The literature on RDT has power at its heart, and organizational success in RDT is defined as 
power maximization (Ulrich & Barney, 1984). Several authors have drawn attention to the 
limited amount of empirical work explicitly extending RDT (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) and argued that RDT needs continued exploration in order to 
remain relevant (Singh, Power, & Chuong, 2011). We answer these various calls by adopting 
RDT in our study. 
Interorganizational power is a relative concept, emerging from the specific context of 
a relationship, and it can serve as a way of managing the relationship (Chicksand, 2009; Cox, 
Ireland, Lonsdlale, & Watson, 2002; Frazier, 1999). An organization’s ability to exercise 
power over another actor will depend on the actor’s dependence on the organization. In turn, 
the nature and availability of the resources controlled by the actors determine the degree of 
dependence experienced (Ramsay, 1996). No organization is self-sufficient, and therefore 
firms will seek to enter a relationship to be able to access resources they need to achieve their 
organizational outcomes. Interorganizational relations are formed to manage interdependence 
between organizations (Antony Paulraj & Chen, 2007; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Singh, et al., 
2011). There will be power imbalance (asymmetrical interdependence) if firm A is more 
dependent on firm B than B is on A. Power depends on the criticality of the resource 
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(commercial and operational importance) and the availability of alternatives to source the 
same resource (scarcity) (Chicksand, 2009; Cox, et al., 2002).  
RDT offers predictions with regard to actions organizations will take to manage 
dependence in terms of power use or power restructuring (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). RDT 
recognizes the importance of external factors on organizational behaviors, and organizations 
can act to minimize uncertainty and dependence that emanate from the external environment 
(Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Ulrich & Barney, 1984).  
Power in Buyer–Supplier Relationships 
In buyer-supplier relationships with power imbalances, the dominant organization is likely to 
exercise its influence over the other party and act to maintain its power, whereas the weaker 
organization is more likely to comply to continue accessing resources (Gulati & Sytch, 2007; 
Kumar, Scheer, & Steenkamps, 1995; Zhu, Sarkis, Lai, & Geng, 2008). 
The powerful firm may act opportunistically (Frazier, 1999; Ireland & Webb, 2007; 
Williamson, 1981), and make agreements that will favor its own interests or encourage 
suppliers to make the majority of investments or relationship specific adaptations (Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005; Cox, Chicksand, & Palmer, 2007; Ramsay, 1996). Powerful organizations 
are likely to resist entering long-term collaborative relationships, as it would signify a loss of 
power due to an increase in dependence (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Ramsay, 1996). Less 
powerful organizations might be reluctant to collaborate with powerful organizations, as they 
might not benefit from the exchange and become overreliant on a specific organization. This 
has been described as a ‘treadmill to oblivion’, whereby there is an expectation from suppliers 
to invest in continuous improvement with diminishing returns (Cox, et al., 2007). 
Power imbalances may have a negative impact on interorganizational relationships, 
which can become less stable and less trusting (Heide, 1994; Kumar, et al., 1995). The 
exploitation of coercive power can undermine an organization’s ability to achieve its goals 
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and be “self-defeating in the long-run” (Kumar, 1996; M. Maloni & Benton, 2000). A careful 
and controlled use of power can, however, promote SC integration and have positive effects 
on performance, providing the power holder understands its supply chain partners and the 
sources of their dependencies (M. Maloni & Benton, 2000). 
The work of Cox et al. (Cox, 2001; Cox, 2004a; Cox & Chicksand, 2007a, 2007b, 
2007c; Cox, et al., 2007; Cox, et al., 2002) provides a useful extension of RDT that enables 
not only mapping power dependencies in given relationships (balanced or imbalanced) but 
also measuring the consequences of those dependencies. Their work has shown that power is 
not static and that buyers and suppliers can use various strategies to alter the dependencies. 
Such strategies can help move, for example, from situations of buyer or supplier dominance to 
interdependence. They include seeking alternative and more buyers/suppliers, developing a 
closer relationship through long-term agreements, or engaging in joint product differentiation 
activities (Cox, 2001; Cox, et al., 2002).    The power regimes perspective combines RDT, 
thinking from the transaction costs literature (Williamson, 1981), and the work of Porter 
(1985) as a mean of linking attributes of buyer and supplier power to relationship-
management styles. These are based upon the way that value is shared in the relationships 
(equal or unequal) and the nature of the working relationship (arms’ length or collaborative). 
Imbalanced power may result in an appropriation by the powerful player of the larger 
share of benefits resulting from the exchange (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Ramsay, 1996). 
This contrasts with cases of interdependence (i.e., cases in which parties are jointly dependent 
on each other), which can lead to more exchange stability and foster collaboration (Kumar, et 
al., 1995; Spekman, Kamauff Jr, & Myhr, 1998). Awareness of the specificities of the 
business ties and relative power is key to developing suitable value-creating and -sharing 
strategies (Chicksand, Ramsay, & Rehme, 2011) 
RELEVANCE OF A POWER PERSPECTIVE IN SSCM 
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Organizational sustainability initiatives are concerned with the transformation of business 
strategies to respond to broader societal issues (Dunphy, Griffiths, & Benn, 2007; Pagell, et 
al., 2010). Sustainable change, contrary to other change initiatives, is not bounded to the 
organizational realm but is linked to external social pressures (A. Paulraj, 2011). 
Sustainability literature views the organization as embedded in a network of stakeholders 
(Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004), where changes in society’s expectations affect an 
organization’s license to operate (Porter & Kramer, 2006). It has been argued that 
organizational sustainability, and therefore sustainability performance, can only be fully 
achieved if sustainability issues are addressed at the SC level (A. Paulraj, 2011; Lutz Preuss, 
2005). SC activities are a critical source of value and competitive advantage for businesses 
(Burgess, Singh, & Koroglu, 2006); thus, an organization’s environmental and social 
performance is affected by that of its suppliers (Tate, Ellram, & Kirchoff, 2010). Simpson and 
Power (2005) have shown that supply relationships “may present a key way for business to 
influence the sustainability of products and services.” 
While collaboration has been advocated as the best way to manage SC relationships 
for sustainability (e.g., Alvarez, Pilbeam, & Wilding, 2010; Vachon & Klassen, (2008), 
Verghese & Lewis, 2007), it is interesting to note that most of SSCM literature tends to focus 
on the actions of large corporations. These large companies benefit from more resources at 
hand to address sustainability issues and are more exposed to external pressure (Zhu, et al., 
2008). When ethical dilemmas arise in a SC, large multinationals are often held responsible 
for the behavior of their suppliers. In order to minimize the risk incurred by scandals in their 
SCs, these large companies will tend to act unilaterally and put pressure on their suppliers to 
adopt codes of conduct and more sustainable business practices (Jeremy Hall, 2001; 
Mollenkopf, Stolze, Tate, & Ueltschy, 2010; E.R. Pedersen & Andersen, 2006). This can be 
challenging for smaller suppliers that have limited capabilities (Lee, 2008; Esben Rahbek 
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Pedersen, 2009). Rather than viewing such imbalanced SSCs from a collaborative paradigm, 
it seems relevant to explore power in SSC relationships and how imbalanced relationships are 
coordinated to achieve sustainability. 
A number of authors have called for more research into the role of power, and 
imbalanced power in particular, in influencing SSC practices. Pedersen and Andersen (2006) 
identified bargaining power as an important mechanism to safeguard codes of conduct. They 
call for further exploration of the cases of SMEs, which also need safeguarding mechanisms 
but may lack the bargaining power and resources. Boyd et al. (2007) suggest investigating the 
impact and use of imbalanced power bases on the ability to establish CSR between SC 
partners. Pullman et al. (2009) call for further research into the impact of power influences in 
the SC on sustainability performance. In their view, power imbalance is highly relevant to 
segments of the food SC and will affect the sharing of sustainability practice costs and 
resulting performance (Pullman, et al., 2009: 49). Overall, relational exchanges in a SSC 
context are complex, and it may be too idealistic to view them solely from a collaborative 
perspective. 
Power, as defined by RDT, helps us understand the choices on how to manage 
sustainability along the SC. Power imbalance can provide opportunities to facilitate the 
implementation and monitoring of socially and environmentally responsible SC practices (J. 
Hall, 2000; L. Preuss, 2001). A powerful buyer has a greater chance of successfully 
implementing SSC practices because it can enforce sustainability requirements and codes 
over its suppliers (Ciliberti, Groot, Haan, & Pontrandolfo, 2009; Millington, 2008; Vurro, 
Russo, & Perrini, 2009). This view of power as an enabler for SSCM has been contested. 
Boyd et al. (2007) argue that the powerful player seeking compliance and using coercive 
mechanisms can become an SC “bully” rather than a “champion.” Hall and Matos (2010) 
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show that power imbalance impedes interfirm learning and knowledge diffusion and 
undermines SSC policies. 
EXTENDING RDT TO SUSTAINABLE SC RELATIONSHIPS 
Managing SSC relationships raises some unique challenges, which lend themselves to a 
power perspective. Implementing SSCM requires stakeholder engagement and buy-in over 
time (Alvarez, et al., 2010) in order to perform, for example, social audits or environmental 
product development (Pagell & Wu, 2009). There is an intrinsic interplay between power and 
trust in SSCM. Shifting from SCM to SSCM will thus lead companies to significantly rethink 
their relationship-management strategies to accommodate changes in the business landscape 
driven by sustainability needs (Pagell, et al., 2010).  
RDT has been applied to SSCM in a limited context and has been used to explain 
variations between firm sizes in SSCM (Zhu, et al., 2008) and to explore the relationship 
between large corporations and SMEs, which often have limited capabilities to engage in 
SSCM (Lee & Klassen, 2008; Esben Rahbek Pedersen, 2009). In this study, we adopt RDT to 
explore imbalanced buyer–supplier–supplier relationships in SSCM 
We investigate how power plays out in SSCM by extending RDT to encompass all 
dimensions of the triple bottom line (economic, social, and environmental). A firm that is 
powerful in commercial terms (controlling critical economic resources) may find itself 
increasingly dependent on other organizations when it comes to controlling social and 
environmental resources. Relative power has an impact on how value is shared in a 
relationship (Cox, 2004b) and may be expressed as social and environmental value as well as 
economic value (Carter & Rogers, 2008; Markley & Davis, 2007). Power imbalance and 
interdependence affect the outcomes of a relationship (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Kumar, et 
al., 1995; Spekman, et al., 1998) and can influence SC partners in subtle ways (M. Maloni & 
Benton, 2000; Provan, 1980). A powerful firm may resist a restructuring of dependencies and 
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will employ mechanisms to maintain its power advantage (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). But it 
is the dominant organization’s choice whether to exercise this power (e.g., coercively to 
ensure compliance), and it may be advantageous to ensure suppliers remain in the relationship 
and act in a mutually beneficial manner (Belaya, Gagalyuk, & Hanf, 2009). 
This study makes a novel contribution by addressing the lack of empirical research 
into the effects of power on buyer–supplier–supplier relationships in SSCM. The following 
section outlines how the study was conducted. 
METHODOLOGY 
In this study, we adopt a case approach that employs a combination of different methods 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Shah & Corley, 2006), including collection of strategy, 
environmental, and CSR documents from organizations in the SC; participant observations; a 
workshop with suppliers; and semistructured interviews with key stakeholders. A qualitative 
case study has been chosen because we seek to explore the relational dynamics around the 
implementation of SSC practices and therefore require an in-depth approach (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003). Case study research is a particularly suitable research strategy 
in the food sector because it allows capturing details, meanings, and social embeddedness 
(Hingley, 2005; Matopoulos, Vlachopoulou, Manthou, & Manos, 2007). Power remains 
largely underinvestigated in SSC relationships, and the case method is appropriate to explore 
this complex phenomenon. It allows for situational and context-specific factors to be 
considered and for capturing the connectedness and embeddedness of the relationships 
(Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 1981; Voss, Tsikriktsis, & Frohlich, 2002). 
Case Selection 
Our research questions emphasize the need to provide in-depth understanding of imbalanced 
power relationships and their impact on sustainability. Therefore, focusing on a single-case 
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exemplar was appropriate. Choosing a single leading company for our research is in line with 
the theoretical sampling approach of the case study methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989). Despite 
the obvious limitation of generalizability advanced against single cases (Voss, et al., 2002), 
studying the case of a leading company often leads to useful insights for benchmarking 
purposes and provides the depth of observation required for an underexplored phenomenon 
(Alvarez, et al., 2010; Barratt, Choi, & Li, 2011). Cases of single firms have been used in 
SSCM research for their longitudinal orientation and the access they offer to multiple contexts 
and units of analysis (e.g. Alvarez, et al., 2010; Byron, Ali, Anton, & Tim, 2008; Sigala, 
2008). We selected the case company Big Food (BF) for four reasons: 
1. The multinational company is behind four of the UK market’s leading consumer brands. It 
has been recognized for its proactive engagement around sustainability over the last 5 
years. It is one of the FT500 companies and is ranked in the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index. It has been a participant in the UN Global Compact since 2008 and is also an active 
member of the Sustainable Agriculture Initiative Platform (SAI) and of the Sustainable 
Food Lab. 
2. The company operates in the food sector, which is theoretically relevant for investigating 
power imbalances, in particular when it comes to relationships between a large firm and 
its small agricultural suppliers (Pullman, et al., 2009). 
3. The company initiated a number of UK–focused sustainability projects in 2010, 
specifically aimed at improving agricultural sustainability and hence requiring working 
with growers. BF has rolled out a number of projects to its suppliers, such as carbon and 
water management, and has worked in collaboration with consultancies and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to develop its strategy and tools. These projects 
constituted ideal settings to observe our phenomena. 
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4. BF was interested in understanding how to better engage with its agricultural suppliers 
and offered access to key participants and decision makers. This represents a relatively 
rare opportunity to be in contact with relevant stakeholders and be able to follow the 
implementation and evolution of the projects and relationships in real time and not 
retrospectively. 
We focused on the relationships between BF and 11 small agricultural suppliers in 
three distinct supply chains (see Figure 1). We were also able to observe horizontal supplier 
relationships, especially in the case of Food A as illustrated by the links between suppliers on 
Figure 1. We aimed at analyzing a number of relationships that would provide enough 
comparative evidence for our case without compromising on the depth of the findings. 
Suppliers were selected not because they were the “best-behaving suppliers”, i.e. suppliers 
that were the most compliant and/or achieved the best results with regards to sustainability 
goals, but because they represented important suppliers in the different chains. Important 
suppliers were chosen in terms of share of supply, position as head of supplier groups, and/or 
relational history with BF (see Table 1). The suppliers included in this study (Table 1) 
represent 100% of supplier groups in both Food A and B, and there is only one supplier 
missing in Food C.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
---------------------------- 
Research Setting: Power and Sustainability in Food Supply Chains 
This study was conducted in the food sector, which lends itself to a power perspective on SSC 
relationships. Food SCs are often characterized by an imbalanced distribution of power 
(Hingley, 2005; Hingley & Lindgreen, 2010). The sector is dominated by a relatively small 
number of large companies that exert a comparatively large control over the trade, production, 
and consumption of food and agricultural commodities (Henson & Humphrey, 2010), which 
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has been coined “buyer-driven (-ness)” (Gereffi, 1994). At the individual SC level, this means 
a power advantage for the “large” focal buyer, for example, food manufacturer or 
supermarket (Fearne, Duffy, & Hornibrook, 2005; Hingley & Lindgreen, 2010). 
The power dynamics of food SCs have major implications on how sustainability 
practices are implemented and managed between SC members (Hingley, 2005). Food SCs are 
particularly critical with regard to sustainable development because of their distinctive social, 
economic, and environmental settings—for example, rural livelihoods, food security, and land 
use (M. J. Maloni & Brown, 2006; Pullman, et al., 2009; Thompson & Scoones, 2009). The 
food industry presents higher risks in the SC related to agricultural sustainability (Hamprecht, 
Corsten, Noll, & Meier, 2005), accounts for a large number of sustainability standards 
(Henson & Humphrey, 2008; Tallontire, 2007), and is highly exposed to public criticism (M. 
J. Maloni & Brown, 2006). Companies have addressed these CSR issues by developing 
standards, certifications, or sustainability programs and defining new modes of governance of 
the production process (Henson & Humphrey, 2008). The sharing of the costs and 
performance gains of these sustainability practices is likely to be impacted by the power 
imbalances characterizing food SCs (Cox, et al., 2007; Pullman, et al., 2009). 
Unit of Analysis 
Our level of analysis is the triad: buyer–supplier–supplier. Traditionally, power relationships 
are studied at the dyadic level between buyers and suppliers (Cox, 2004a; Kumar, 1996). 
Recently authors in SCM have argued that considering triads could help link the dyadic to the 
network level of analysis and account for structural embeddedness (T. Choi & Kim, 2008; T. 
Y. Choi & Wu, 2009; Wilhelm, 2011). As well as investigating dyadic buyer-supplier 
relationships, we added a further analysis of our findings at the horizontal level of 
relationships between suppliers, which we were able to observe during meetings, during the 
workshop, and in the interviews. Supplier–supplier relations have strong strategic 
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implications for a focal firm, as they influence the process and outcomes of buyer–supplier 
relationships (Wu & Choi, 2005). They represent a link between what the focal firm can 
control (the design of the network) and the more emergent, invisible part of the network (T. 
Y. Choi & Dooley, 2009). Relationships between suppliers are more complex and dynamic 
than vertical buyer–supplier relationships (Wu & Choi, 2005). They are characterized by 
coopetition—that is, simultaneous competition and cooperation—and can influence how 
power plays out in the network (Wilhelm, 2011; Wu & Choi, 2005). Organizations 
performing well in sustainability may adopt strategies to manage the interaction between their 
suppliers (Pagell & Wu, 2009). The triadic level is underrepresented in SSCM research 
(Carter & Easton, 2011), and we therefore make a pertinent contribution to the field. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
---------------------------- 
Data Collection 
We conducted semistructured interviews with representatives of both the buying and selling 
organizations. Within the large customer firm, purchasing, agriculture, and sustainability 
managers were chosen as key informants because of their position as “boundary spanners” 
(Andersen & Kumar, 2006; Eltantawy, Fox, & Giunipero, 2009; D. F. Simpson & Power, 
2005; Wilhelm, 2011) and their level of experience regarding the specific relationships. 
Within the supplier firms, we interviewed people with the highest level of expertise regarding 
the relationship with the customer, such as owners, managing directors, or BF customer 
relationship managers. The supplier firms are either small or medium enterprises and very 
often family owned. Theoretical saturation also guided the number of interviews included in 
this study, and we stopped interviewing when we felt that we were not gaining additional 
insights (Kaufmann & Denk, 2011). 
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---------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
---------------------------- 
The total number of interviews included in this study is 32 (Table 2). Three of the 
interviews at the buying firm have been counted three times, since the managers discussed 
suppliers across the three different supply chains. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 2 
hours. They were all digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed and were kept 
anonymous due to commercial sensitivity. Follow-up phone conversations and emails allowed 
for clarifications and additional details. Transcripts were sent to participants for feedback. 
We developed a semistructured interview protocol, as it allows for both focus and 
flexibility (Gilham, 2005) and ensures that interviewees have freedom to develop their 
answers. We constructed the questions around two dimensions: power/dependence and 
relationship management for SSCM, allowing us to explore manifestations of power in the 
structure and transaction processes of the relationship (Premkumar & Ramamurthy, 1995: 
307). Within these two dimensions of power/dependence and relationship management, we 
developed several interview themes drawing on the literature (Appendix A) that we then 
formulated as questions in the semistructured interview protocol (Appendix B). Questions 
were adapted for the buyer and supplier sides. 
The interview protocol was refined through discussions between the authors and 
piloted with two individuals. It was then further reviewed after the first three interviews. For 
example, in addition to asking the interviewee’s own definition of SSCM, we also provided 
the definition we use in this paper in order to clarify our focus on the three dimensions of the 
triple bottom line. 
Data Analysis 
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We followed several steps to analyze the data. First, each relationship was evaluated in terms 
of power/dependence and whether it could be categorized as buyer dominance, supplier 
dominance, independence, or interdependence (Table 3). 
 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
---------------------------- 
Responses regarding relationship management were analyzed according to themes 
(Appendix A) in order to explore manifestations of power in the implementation of 
sustainable practices in the SC. We analyzed whether the existence of a power imbalance 
meant that the powerful player used power through different relational mechanisms and in 
what ways it was used. We also analyzed positive or negative attitudes from the parties under 
influence and if there were any signs of resistance to change. We looked at how equally the 
risks and benefits from engaging in sustainability projects were shared between buyer and 
supplier. Evidence from statements about investments, contractual terms, price, and impact on 
business performance were used to support our judgment as to who benefits or suffers more in 
the relationship. Horizontal relationships between suppliers in the different SCs were 
analyzed subsequently, looking at both the buyer’s strategic intent for these relationships and 
relational patterns observed between suppliers during fieldwork. Once all relationships were 
analyzed individually, we used tables to draw comparisons between them and let patterns and 
differences emerge. 
Rigor and Quality 
The overall “trustworthiness” of our research (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Shah & Corley, 2006) 
was ensured through various methods described in Table 4. In particular, the combined 
expertise of the authors in SSCM and SC power concepts has ensured critical review 
throughout the research process. We analyzed the interview data using a grid based upon 
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interview themes as detailed in the Appendix, thereby ensuring a common objective frame of 
reference for the authors. Finally, we focused on specific buyer-supplier interaction but 
protected the informants’ confidentiality to ensure the credibility and dependability of the 
information collected. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 here 
---------------------------- 
FINDINGS 
Measuring Power Imbalance 
The interview findings regarding criticality and scarcity have allowed us to map the different 
relationships on the power/dependence matrix (Table 3). The analysis of the power 
relationships is presented in Table 5. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 here 
---------------------------- 
 All the relationships reflect an existing power imbalance between customer and 
supplier. Most relationships between BF and its SME suppliers fall into the buyer dominance 
category. Only three relationships can be categorized as supplier dominance. Details and 
evidence of the dominant relationship types are presented in Table 6. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 here 
---------------------------- 
Buyer Dominance 
We found that all relationships with Food A suppliers were dominated by the buyer. BF 
accounts for a relatively high proportion of supplier revenue, between 10% for supplier A2 
and 90% for supplier A3. Suppliers of Food A mentioned the lack of alternatives to sell their 
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agricultural products, which results in a high level of dependence on the buyer. This lock-in is 
reinforced by the capital requirements of growing crop A. The buyer has more flexibility 
regarding its supply base, with more than 100 growers producing the crop. Supplier A1 and 
Supplier C2 can actually be considered dedicated suppliers, as the former supplies crop A to 
BF only and the latter was created at the request of BF to provide a secure supply of crop C. 
Suppliers’ accounts of tense price negotiations and tough contractual agreements 
provide further evidence of buyer dominance. Although most of the relationships have been 
ongoing for several decades, contracts have been signed every year, with a push from the 
buyer to drive prices down. BF is reluctant to enter long-term agreements with the suppliers. 
The supplier base is managed through supplier groups, which nominally appear to be aimed at 
strengthening the connection between suppliers and buyers. However, in practice, this has 
primarily allowed BF to exert more operational control over these dedicated suppliers 
through, for example, more stringent quality requirements, vendor assurance audits, and a 
transfer of operational responsibilities to the growers (e.g., washing, storage, quality control).  
It was evident however that there were varying degrees of buyer dominance between 
BF and their suppliers. This had an impact on the level of SSCM compliance. In relationships 
with the most significant power differentials (e.g. A.1.1, A.1, A3), the suppliers were more 
inclined to comply and respond to BFs’ demands for fear of losing their contract. This 
translated into, for example, supplier’s quickly sending back filled in questionnaires to appear 
responsive and acquiescent. These suppliers were also more willing to trial some of BF’s new 
initiatives such as testing alternative crop varieties. The degree of power therefore provided 
BF with more potential to impose their sustainability agenda. In the relationships with a lesser 
degree of buyer dominance (e.g. A.2, A.6), suppliers complained about having to comply with 
multiple sustainability demands from different customers. As they were less reliant on BF 
they were able to postpone responding to BF’s demands, for example, providing carbon 
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measurement information. The relationship with BF provided these suppliers with opportunity 
to develop an expertise on sustainability, which they were then able to use to leverage better 
contracts with other customers.   
Supplier Dominance 
Suppliers B1, B2, and C1 are in a dominant position compared to BF mainly because of the 
flexibility of their positions. While they are happy to maintain the relationship with BF, they 
have a number of alternative supply options for their crop, and in the case of B, they are able 
to exit the relationship without having to incur additional costs. This means that BF finds 
itself in a position in which it has to rely on these suppliers to obtain the crops that are central 
to its new “healthy and sustainable” product portfolio. 
 Evidence of supplier dominance is also visible in the contractual arrangements. In 
these cases, the suppliers seem reluctant to enter into long-term agreements with BF because 
this may present a risk to them, as it would mean being locked in to BF. 
Shifting Levels of Dependence 
The findings presented above primarily reflect the power/dependence structure of the 
relationships in commercial terms. There is evidence suggesting that the recent inclusion of 
sustainability in the relationship has led to a restructuring of dependencies. Figure 2 illustrates 
evidence of the shift to interdependence. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here 
---------------------------- 
BF is becoming increasingly reliant on its suppliers to achieve its sustainability 
targets. When talking about the necessity to reduce carbon emissions and improve water-
management practices, the agricultural team expressed concerns about BF’s ability to reach 
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its targets, considering that it was the growers who were responsible for managing the 
environmental resources. 
“It is not us delivering because we are not farming anything, we don't farm 
things.”(Agronomist at Big-Food) 
This highlights the fact that the growers have privileged access to the natural 
environment compared to the buyer. The suppliers also deal with social issues such as 
managing seasonal/temporary labor hired for harvesting. The growers are therefore very 
critical for the buyer in terms of environmental and social sustainability in the SC. 
The intermediary role played by first-tier suppliers is another important aspect, which 
revealed that BF’s dependence was increasing when it came to SSCM. 
“The big concern from me is how you get out to all the growers because this is the 
agriculture team [pointing at 3 members] so physically we cannot do it ourselves.” (Head 
of agriculture team at BF) 
The relationships with the first-tier suppliers are key to ensure engagement with 
sustainability farther up the chain. One of the suppliers highlighted that “good growers” were 
disappearing, and it was in BF’s interest to try and retain them through their first-tier 
relationships. 
“Our job is to cascade that down to the growers further up the chain and generate the 
interest and the understanding and how important they find it.” (Supplier A1) 
Similarly, there was evidence that dominant suppliers’ dependence on BF was 
increasing in the context of managing environmental and social resources. In particular, as the 
food industry is becoming stricter regarding environmental and social standards, the suppliers 
see the relationship with BF as a critical way to access the knowledge and skills they will 
need in the market.  
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“Discussing sustainability with BF had an impact on us in terms of making us think 
differently about where our industry is headed (…) I think that BF are several steps 
ahead of everyone else.  And we’re very much looking at the relationship that we have 
with BF now as being probably quite a good insight into the way we will trade with a 
lot more people in the future.” (Supplier B1) 
In addition, dominant suppliers were incentivized to enter longer-term agreements 
with BF. From BF’s point of view this was a way to ensure the continuity of supply for their 
healthy product portfolio. From the suppliers’ perspective there was a price advantage in 
entering into a longer-term agreement, despite the relative loss of power. 
“We’ve been able to get a slightly better price in return for giving that commitment.” 
(Supplier B2) 
The relationships have been mapped according to the power dynamics observed, as 
shown in Figure 3. The analysis presented in Table 5 illustrates that the power dynamics 
within the relationships were not always the same. Some relationships were clearly aligned 
with the classification criteria shown in Table 3 and the critical themes as identified in Table 
6. These relationships were therefore positioned toward the boundaries of the quadrants, 
demonstrating a greater degree of buyer or supplier dominance, i.e. RA1 and RB1. In 
contrast, those relationships that showed only a partial fit were positioned relative to how 
closely they matched the profiles described in Table 3 i.e. RA2 and RB2. This process 
required interpretation by the researchers, as the existing power model (Cox, 2001; Cox, 
2004a) did not incorporate varying degrees of power imbalance within the four broad 
categories.  
The analysis has therefore captured the degree of power imbalance within the 
relationships, rather than fitting them into one of four broad categories (i.e. buyer dominance, 
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supplier dominance, interdependence, independence). Having a more nuanced approach to the 
categorization of power relationships is a significant finding, but one which requires fuller 
investigation and explanation in the future. The dotted arrows indicate that as the relationships 
evolve to encompass sustainability goals, there is evidence that dependencies are shifting 
toward interdependence. Regardless of whether the starting point is supplier dominance or 
buyer dominance, through the actions of the different players or simply as a result of 
increasing dependence on now-key resources (i.e. 1st order schemes shown in Figure 2), there 
is a convergence toward interdependence. A move to interdependence for either dominant 
buyers or suppliers will result in a loss of power. However, in return it is likely that there will 
be advantages such as preferential terms, increased security, knowledge exchange, more 
significant joint learning opportunities and hence a greater potential to fulfill the sustainability 
agenda. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 here 
---------------------------- 
Horizontal Relationships and Power 
Analyzing the relationships between suppliers reveals that the buyer's strategic intent is to try 
and manage the relationships between the suppliers, especially in the case of Food A, to 
achieve both its sustainability goals (encourage them to collaborate) and more short-term 
economic goals (foster competition between them). However, as the suppliers are increasingly 
collaborating, they become more conscious of their own power over the buyer and become 
more resistant to changing their practices. Bargaining power shifts in favor of the suppliers 
when considering the horizontal relationships. Relationships between suppliers in Food A are 
coopetitive, and BF attempts to advance sustainability while encouraging price competition. 
Coopetition is visible through the expectations from BF for suppliers to collaborate and share 
26 
 
learning on carbon and water management within the group but compete on price; and when 
competing suppliers share the cost of investing in new environmentally friendly storage 
facilities. This approach implies that suppliers in Food A are willing to maintain a long-term 
relationship and comply with the buyer’s requirements while tolerating a short-termist 
behavior regarding contracts and prices. As it is often difficult for suppliers to understand the 
antagonistic pressures from the buyer, this leads to resentment and solidarity among them 
despite competition.  
In this study there is a clear power imbalance between BF and individual suppliers. 
Although this power differential still remains, when we consider the suppliers as a group (i.e. 
Food A) there are some subtle changes in how power manifests itself in the relationship. 
While on an individual basis the suppliers find it difficult to resist the demands from BF, they 
have a more effective voice as a group. When BF purchased drip irrigation equipment and 
gave it to the suppliers, as a group they discussed BF’s initiative and chose not to install the 
technology. This was because they had not been consulted before the purchase and the 
solution would add extra costs to their operations. Without the forum to be able to talk over 
this issue, suppliers of Food A would have been unlikely to resist this initiative. Clearly the 
supplier groups are a setting imposed by BF but the non-expected side effect of this is the 
emerging sense of group power when it comes to questions of sustainability, which does not 
exist on an individual supplier basis.  
There is a high risk of relationship failure in Food A, as the buyer continues to exploit 
its power position to try and manage the relationships between its suppliers. Characteristics of 
horizontal relationships are summarized in Table 7. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 here 
---------------------------- 
Power Influences in Relationship Management for Sustainability 
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We found several indications of how power affects the management of relationships around 
sustainability issues. We have labeled these “power influences on SSC relationships” and 
classify them according to which dimension of the relationship they affect. Evidence of these 
power influences is presented in Table 8. 
---------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 here 
---------------------------- 
BF has been using its powerful position to advance its sustainability agenda with the 
growers. The terms employed by members of the agriculture and purchasing team within BF 
confirm the idea of a push for sustainability and the necessity for the suppliers to comply with 
requirements. There is evidence of coercive power in the contractual arrangements and in the 
one-way communication, with emphasis on monitoring and the lack of involvement of the 
suppliers in planning and setting the sustainability goals. 
Power imbalance is also reflected in the unequal sharing of investments and risks in 
relation to sustainability (e.g., storage investments required from the growers, climate change 
risks for growers). This inequality is reinforced by the lack of alignment between the 
commercial goals (“more forensic on costs”) and the sustainability agenda of the buyer. The 
suppliers have a challenge to find the necessary resources to comply with the sustainability 
requirements. As its dependence on suppliers increases, BF is reluctant to enter long-term 
agreements, which could provide further engagement on sustainability. 
The use of power to implement sustainability appears to have its limits, as BF is faced 
with growing resistance and resentment from the suppliers. All the suppliers interviewed have 
expressed their desire to see greater demonstration by the buyer of the mutuality of the 
relationship and greater recognition of the specific efforts they make and difficulties they face 
in addressing sustainability issues. Power imbalance has impacted how sustainability goals 
have been defined, with little consideration for the growers’ perspective and expertise. This 
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has reinforced suppliers’ negative feelings about the quality of the relationship with the buyer. 
This resistance has led to a lot of uncertainty for BF in terms of whether it will achieve its 
sustainability goals (e.g., carbon reduction). For instance, the buyer faces uncertainty 
regarding the accuracy of the environmental data it requires from the suppliers and finds it 
difficult to move beyond minimal levels of compliance. 
Interestingly, when dealing with dominant suppliers, there was a minimal level of 
engagement around sustainability in the relationships, which are more focused on commercial 
aspects and price. BF has made recent attempts to try and restructure the relationships with 
the suppliers in its favor by trying to negotiate longer-term agreements. This is a way of 
reducing the suppliers’ bargaining power while advancing sustainability. Conversely, weaker 
suppliers can also adopt the same strategy to increase BFs’ dependence on the supplier and 
increase their bargaining power. It is evident therefore that power relationships are dynamic 
and that buyers and suppliers can employ strategies to restructure the dependencies. 
In terms of outcomes, BF has managed to significantly reduce the carbon emissions 
(≈2%) and water consumption (≈14.%) in its SCs. Despite this progress, BF is not sure of 
being able to reach its goal of halving CO2 by 2015.  Suppliers are required to measure the 
carbon impact of their activities through a computer-based tool. However, gathering the data 
represent big challenges. BF employees send out many reminders and have to constantly 
chase suppliers, who view these requirements as additional hurdles with no additional 
benefits. Social initiatives have not been implemented because they are viewed as more 
difficult to measure and less relevant to agricultural suppliers in the UK. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Theoretical Implications 
The results from this study provide four key findings, which have then led to formulating six 
propositions. First, the research shows that a powerful organization can drive sustainability in 
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its SC. Dependent suppliers in this situation have little choice but to comply with the buyer’s 
requirements and are obliged to invest specifically in the relationship to become more 
sustainable. These findings are in line with previous work, which suggested that buyer power 
represents a resource to force supplier compliance to sustainability requirements (Ciliberti, et 
al., 2009; J. Hall, 2000; Ireland & Webb, 2007; L. Preuss, 2001). Buyer power constitutes an 
effective tool for sustainability, as a power imbalance in favor of a large proactive buyer 
allows them to define and drive the sustainability agenda on dependent suppliers, ensure 
compliance, and stimulate collaboration around sustainability between their network of 
suppliers. This is especially relevant in the case of small suppliers whose engagement in 
sustainability may be limited without the pressure from a powerful customer, as shown in 
previous research (Lee & Klassen, 2008; Millington, 2008; Esben Rahbek Pedersen, 2009). 
There were additional indications in our study that the degree of power imbalance between 
the buyer and supplier affects the level of supplier compliance and willingness to engage in 
sustainability projects. Specifically, in cases where there was strong buyer dominance, the 
suppliers were more likely to comply whereas in less extreme cases suppliers were more 
likely to be resistant. This leads to our first two propositions. 
Proposition 1a: Buyer dominance is positively associated with the adoption and 
implementation of SSCM. 
Proposition 1b: The degree of buyer dominance is positively associated with the level of 
supplier compliance to SSCM. 
However, when the power imbalance is in favor of the supplier, the engagement 
around sustainability in the relationship remains minimal. This corroborates the view that 
relatively independent suppliers do not feel as much pressure to comply with the buyer’s 
requirements (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). This creates a high level of uncertainty for a 
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buyer looking to achieve sustainability goals. As a consequence, such imbalanced 
relationships may be characterized by attempts from the dependent buyer to restructure the 
relationship to advance its sustainability goals (e.g., seek longer-term agreements, implement 
knowledge-sharing processes). This leads to the second proposition. 
Proposition 2: Supplier dominance is negatively associated with the adoption and 
implementation of SSCM. 
A powerful buyer’s demanding sustainability requirements, combined with adversarial 
commercial practices, is likely to create confusion and uncertainty for suppliers. In the long 
term, it can also undermine the long-term economic sustainability of smaller suppliers, as they 
bear a higher share of risks and costs of the sustainability initiatives, proportionally to their 
available resources, while benefiting less from their adoption than the buyer does. This can be 
likened to a ‘technological treadmill to oblivion’ as observed in previous research in other 
food SCs and contexts (Cox, et al., 2007). In addition, attempts by the buyer to use its 
powerful position to advance sustainability result in a perception by suppliers of a degradation 
of the quality of the relationships, particularly as communication and decision making appear 
rather unilateral. As this feeling becomes shared among the majority of suppliers in the SC, a 
sense of solidarity emerges, and suppliers become increasingly reluctant to cooperate with the 
buyer’s requirements. Our research therefore reveals that supplier–supplier relations in SSCs 
emerge beyond the control of the powerful buyer and will have an effect on the overall 
sustainability performance, hence supporting previous findings on horizontal relationships (T. 
Choi & Kim, 2008; T. Y. Choi & Dooley, 2009; T. Y. Choi & Wu, 2009; Wu & Choi, 2005). 
This can help answer the question of where the boundaries of a buyer’s responsibility lie in a 
supply network, highlighted by Amaeshi et al. (2008). These aspects constitute potential 
barriers to the advancement of SSCM in the future and lead to the following two propositions. 
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Proposition 3a: The use of buyer power on dependent suppliers creates resistance, which 
impair the long-term achievement of sustainability goals. 
Proposition 3b: Interaction between suppliers favors the emergence of a shared feeling of 
resistance, which counteracts the use of buyer power for SSCM. 
The study revealed that levels of dependence between players might shift when 
considering sustainability. A dominant buyer can become increasingly dependent on its 
suppliers to access and control environmental and social resources, which are critical to 
achieving SSC goals. In this case, joint dependence becomes higher and provides a 
foundation for both parties to develop longer-term organizational arrangements, which align 
commercial and sustainability goals. However, as predicted by past research using RDT, the 
dominant buyer is likely to resist loss of discretion to maintain its bargaining power and 
advantageous exchange conditions (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). The resulting 
confrontational atmosphere undermines collaboration on sustainability practices, as parties 
have difficulty creating mutually beneficial relationship conditions (Belaya, et al., 2009). This 
supports our earlier suggestion that RDT needs to be extended in SSCM to account for not 
only economic but also environmental and social dimensions of the relationships. These 
findings lead to our last proposition. 
Proposition 4: Levels of dependence and power shift in favor of suppliers when considering 
the buyer’s necessity to access environmental and social resources to implement SSCM. 
Managerial Implications 
This study has implications for buyers and SC managers seeking to advance the sustainability 
agenda. We found that a powerful buyer has the opportunity to enforce and monitor its 
sustainability requirements with suppliers. In addition, the ability of a buyer to understand and 
manage relationships among its suppliers is critical to advance sustainability. 
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However, there were indications that power may become a controversial tool for 
SSCM and impair further engagement for sustainability. Coercive power may only lead to 
compliance with minimum requirements because it affects suppliers’ commitment (Boyd, et 
al., 2007; Handley & Benton, 2012), and suppliers within the same network may develop a 
sense of solidarity against the buyer.  
Power imbalance can make it difficult to balance economic with environmental and 
social goals in the SC. An unanticipated consequence of commercial buyer power can mean 
that the long-term economic sustainability of smaller suppliers is undermined. While large 
companies may have access to more resources to engage with the sustainability agenda, small 
firms have a critical role to play in ensuring that sustainability goals are met. They often 
constitute the link between the large company and critical environmental and social resources 
and also are connected to other parties in the network. Managers need take into account the 
responsibility held by small firms in order to develop appropriate risk- and value-sharing 
strategies. 
The evolution toward a relationship for sustainability requires aligning commercial 
and sustainability goals, as well as acknowledging that dependence on suppliers increases due 
to the imperative of managing environmental and social resources. It is important for 
managers to understand the sources of power and dependences in their SC for power to 
become an effective tool to advance sustainability. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
We have developed a number of propositions from our study, and an obvious avenue for 
future research would be to further test them. We recognize the limited generalizability of our 
findings, as we report on a single embedded case of a large focal company working with 
multiple small suppliers in the UK food sector. 
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The food industry presents relatively specific features with regard to sustainability and 
power relationships, and it would be interesting to extend the research to other sectors, across 
different geographical locations, and between overseas buyer–supplier relationships. A 
longitudinal study of a number of SC relationships could provide deeper insights into the 
evolution of SC relationships for sustainability. 
In addition, further work is needed to explore the implications of the degree of power 
imbalance in relationships. As has been suggested by this research, in relationships where 
there was significant buyer dominance, rather than weaker buyer dominance, it was more 
likely that the supplier would fully comply with the SSCM agenda.  
We see additional opportunities to apply and extend RDT in SSCM research. For 
instance, combining RDT with stakeholder theory would gain insights into how firms manage 
and prioritize stakeholder dependencies in the SC. RDT could be used to explore the political 
mechanisms through which organizations create conditions that are more favorable to their 
sustainability interests (e.g., lobbying government for transition to low-carbon technologies). 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we offer new evidence into the management of triadic relationships in SSCM. 
We have made a novel contribution by adopting a power perspective and extended the RDT 
model to explore SSC relationships. This study contributes to the advancement of SSCM 
research by offering a theoretically underpinned approach to empirically investigate the 
implementation of sustainability practices between a large focal firm and its small suppliers.  
Our findings support RDT in explaining how commercial dependence can foster 
compliance and how the dominant player can use power to drive sustainability in the SC by 
pushing the cost of sustainability onto the weaker party while gaining the bigger share of 
performance gains. In this sense, power can undermine the advancement of sustainability in 
the SC, as it is likely to create resistance from collaborating parties but also weaken their 
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ability to engage in longer-term sustainability strategy by reducing their economic bottom 
line. Horizontal relationships among suppliers, although creating a platform for the buyer to 
encourage supplier collaboration on environmental and social projects, can create concerns 
for the long-term pursuit of sustainability goals as suppliers develop a sense of group power 
and combine forces against the buyer. 
Finally, our findings suggest that the evolution from a commercially focused 
relationship to one that encompasses sustainability issues may result in a change in the levels 
and nature of dependencies. This transition may lead to conflict, as the existing powerful 
player will resist entering into longer agreements. This situation is a potential barrier to 
further engagement between parties to address key sustainability issues. 
Overall, we have shown that power imbalance is not necessarily detrimental to the 
advancement of SSCM. Rather, it is crucial that managers develop a clear understanding of 
the power/dependence structure of their supply chain relationships in order to identify 
appropriate management strategies that can facilitate the advancement of environmental, 
social, and economic goals. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW THEMES 
Power/Dependence 
Theme Description Literature 
Criticality  
The more critical the resource for an actor, the more dependent this actor will 
be on the resource provider. 
 Scarcity If little or no alternative exists, the higher the level of dependence. 
(Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; 
Chicksand, 2009; Cox & 
Chicksand, 2007c) 
Relationship Management for SSCM 
Construct Description Literature 
Relationship history 
The history of interaction between partners is likely to influence present 
conditions and future exchange. 
(Benton & Maloni, 2005; Heide 
& John, 1990; Wu & Choi, 
2005) 
Contractual 
arrangements 
Understanding the contractual arrangements as formal interfirm governance 
mechanisms revealing the relationship orientation (adversarial, collaborative, 
etc.). Terms and enforcement of contracts can be influenced by the power 
structure of the relationship and reveal the equal or unequal sharing of costs 
and benefits. 
(Benton & Maloni, 2005; 
Chicksand, 2009; Frazier, 1999; 
Monczka, Petersen, Handfield, & 
Ragatz, 1998; D. Simpson, 
Power, & Samson, 2007) 
Implementation 
process & monitoring 
Understanding governance mechanisms in place to reduce opportunistic 
behaviors and information asymmetry. Evaluation is viewed as an important 
mechanism in SSCM and, in particular, supplier assessments are often 
conducted to increase performance. Also indicates use of compliance and 
engagement mechanisms. 
(Chicksand, 2009; Frazier, 1999; 
Heide & John, 1990; D. 
Simpson, et al., 2007) 
Communication  
Evaluate the communication and information-sharing processes in place in a 
given relationship. The quantity and quality of communication impacts the 
quality of the relationship. Also serves to understand the level of interaction 
(one-way, two-way communication, type of information exchanged). 
(Benton & Maloni, 2005; 
Frazier, 1999; Fynes, De Búrca, 
& Marshall, 2004; Lindgreen, 
2001; Monczka, et al., 1998) 
Commitment 
Dimension that shows the willingness of both buyers and suppliers to 
cooperate and exert efforts for the relationship. Relationship-specific 
investments and adaptation are reflections of commitment. Power use 
influences the level of commitment of partners. 
(Benton & Maloni, 2005; 
Chicksand, 2009; Frazier, 1999; 
Fynes, et al., 2004; Lindgreen, 
2001; Monczka, et al., 1998; D. 
Simpson, et al., 2007) 
Planning & goal setting 
This shows the extent to which partners cooperate in activities (level of joint 
and individual activities) such as development and design of sustainability 
programs. It also reveals the time orientation of the relation (short or long 
term).  
(Benton & Maloni, 2005; El-
Ansary & Stern, 1972; Frazier, 
1999; Fynes, et al., 2004; Heide 
& John, 1990; Lindgreen, 2001) 
Problem resolution The problem- and conflict-resolution techniques will influence the quality of (Benton & Maloni, 2005; 
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the relationship and performance. The way problems are addressed reveals if 
there are coercive influences or more constructive joint approaches. 
Chicksand, 2009; Lindgreen, 
2001; Monczka, et al., 1998) 
Sharing of benefits & 
risks 
Level to which costs and performance gains of the relationship are shared 
between partners. Understanding if relationship-specific investments and 
adaptation are equally or unequally shared.  
(Benton & Maloni, 2005; 
Chicksand, 2009; Pullman, et al., 
2009) 
Continuity/future 
expectations 
This measures both parties’ expectations of future interactions. It shows the 
perceptions of the durability of the relationship. This is a future-oriented 
dimension, which complements the historical duration dimension that looks at 
past association.  
(Heide & John, 1990) 
 
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
A. General/Background 
A.1 Background on organization, position, job title, and responsibilities. 
A.2 What is your understanding of sustainability and sustainable supply chain management in particular? 
B. Power/Dependence 
B.1 Criticality 
B.1.1 How critical is this buyer/supplier in your overall business (commercially and operationally)? 
B.1.2 (Supplier) How much does this buyer represent (%) in your total turnover? 
B.1.3 How much does the relationship with this supplier/buyer affect your environmental and social 
performance? 
B.2 Scarcity 
B.2.1 (Supplier) How many alternative buyers (existing or potential) do you have for this product? 
B.2.2 (Buyer) How many existing and potential suppliers do you have for this item? 
C. Relationship Management for SSCM 
C.1 History 
 C.1.1 Can you tell me more about your relationship history with this buyer/supplier? 
C.2 Contractual arrangements 
C.2.1 Could you describe your contractual arrangements with this buyer/supplier? (Length, terms, 
negotiation) 
 C.2.2 Are there any sustainability requirements in your contract? (Examples) 
C.3 Implementation process and monitoring 
C.3.1 Can you give examples of sustainability projects you have been involved in with this 
buyer/supplier? 
C.3.2 In general, how are sustainability initiatives implemented and monitored? 
C.4 Communication 
C.4.1 How often do you communicate/interact with this buyer/supplier? 
C.4.2 Could you describe how you communicate with this buyer/supplier about sustainability? 
C.5 Commitment 
C.5.1 How committed are you to working with this buyer/supplier to implement a sustainable strategy? 
C.5.2 Do you invest specifically in this relationship to facilitate the implementation of sustainability 
initiatives? 
C.6 Planning and goal setting 
C.6.1 Could you describe how decisions about the planning, development, and implementation of 
sustainability initiatives are made? 
C.6.2 How are goals regarding sustainability set? 
C.7 Problem resolution 
C.7.1 Can you give me an example of sustainability-related project that has been particularly 
challenging? 
C.7.2 In general, if there is a problem, how is it addressed? (Examples) 
C.8 Sharing of benefits and risks 
C.8.1 (Buyer) How do you support the implementation of sustainability projects with this supplier? 
C.8.2 (Supplier) How are you supported to implement sustainability projects with this buyer? 
C.8.3 Can you give me an example of a particularly successful initiative? 
C.8.4 Overall, how would you evaluate your working relationship with this buyer/supplier regarding 
sustainability? 
C.8.5 How has working on sustainability affected your relationship? 
C.8.6 How has working on sustainability with this buyer/supplier influenced your business? 
(Performance, financial, nonfinancial aspects) 
D. Conclusion: Future and Mutual Expectations 
D.1 What do you expect now and in the future from your relationship with this buyer/supplier regarding 
sustainability in particular? 
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D.2 How essential is your relationship with this buyer/supplier in the future success of your business? 
 
TABLES 
Table 1: Description of Participating Companies 
 Description Ownership 
% turnover 
attributed to 
BF 
Annual 
Turnover 
2010 
Number of 
Employees 
Length of 
Relation 
With BF 
Size 
(European 
Commission, 
2003) 
N 
Interviewees 
Big Food 
Multinational food & 
drinks manufacturing 
company 
Public N/A $58bn > 5,000 UK - Large 10 
Supplier 
A1 
Local merchant, 
supplier and packer of 
crop A 
Private 
(family) 
35% < £35m < 250 > 40 years Medium 2 
A1.1 
Local vegetable and 
cereal farmer 
Private 
(family) 
35% < £500k < 10 > 10 years Micro 1 
A2 
European vegetable and 
cereal farming group 
Private 10% < £30m < 250 > 40 years Medium 1 
A3 
Local vegetable and 
cereal farmer 
Private 
(family) 
90% < £3m < 50 > 30 years Small 1 
A4 
Local vegetable and 
cereal farmer and 
merchant 
Private 
(family) 
20% < £5m < 50 > 30 years Small 2 
A5 
Local grower group of 
crop A 
Private 40% < £8m < 50 > 40 years Small 2 
A6 
Local vegetable farmer 
and packer 
Private 
(family) 
40% < £40m < 250 > 30 years Medium 1 
B1 
Regional agricultural 
merchant and supplier 
Private 
(family) 
3% < £40m < 250 > 20 years Medium 2 
B2 
Local vegetable and 
cereal farmer 
Private 
(family) 
10% < £8m < 10 > 10 years Small 1 
C1 Local crop C merchants Private 3% < £8m < 50 > 10 years Small 1 
C2 Local crop C producer 
Private 
(family) 
40% < £8m < 50 > 30 years Small 1 
 
Table 2: List of Expert Interviews by Supply Chain 
Supply Chain 
Number of 
Relationships 
Number of 
Interviews at 
Supplying Firms 
Number of 
Interviews at 
Buying Firm 
FOOD A 7 10 7 
FOOD B 2 3 5 
FOOD C 2 2 5 
Total 11 15 17 
Total number of 
interviews 
 32 
 
Tables 3: Power Relationships Types and Classification Criteria (Source: Adapted from 
Chicksand, 2009) 
HIGH 
Buyer Dominance 
Buyer power is high when the dependence on 
the supplier is low, that is, criticality of the 
resource is relatively low (low operational and 
commercial importance) and the scarcity of 
alternative is low (i.e., availability of other 
suppliers). Supplier power is low because the 
buyer is very critical for the supplier and there 
is no or little alternative to supply somewhere 
else. 
Independence 
Situation in which both buyer and supplier show 
a low level of dependence on each other (low 
levels of resource criticality and low levels of 
scarcity). 
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LOW Interdependence Supplier Dominance 
43 
 
 Situation in which both buyer and supplier 
show a high level of dependence on each other 
(high levels of resource criticality and high 
levels of scarcity). 
Buyer power is low when the dependence on the 
supplier is high, that is, criticality of the 
resource is relatively high and the scarcity of 
alternative is high (i.e., limited availability of 
other suppliers). Supplier power is high because 
the buyer is not critical for the supplier and 
there are alternatives/substitutes available for 
the supplier. 
LOW HIGH 
Attributes of Supplier Power Relative to Buyer 
 
Table 4: Methods for Ensuring Trustworthiness Throughout the Research Process 
 Research Phases 
Criterion Design Case Selection Data Collection Data Analysis 
• Credibility Theoretical framework 
Adoption of constructs 
identified in previous 
research 
Choice of leading 
company in FTSE500 
and Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index 
Multiple informants 
Triangulation of 
data sources 
Extended period of 
fieldwork 
Combination of 
researchers’ 
experiences in SSCM 
and power 
Transcripts sent to 
participants for 
feedback 
• Transferability Description of sampling 
strategy 
Selection of leading 
company  
Detailed description of 
research setting and 
participating companies 
Detailed notes of 
events and 
observations 
Description of concepts 
and categories 
Within- and cross-case 
analysis 
• Dependability Case study protocol Theoretical sampling Interview protocol 
developed 
iteratively 
Confidentiality of 
participants 
Intercoder agreement 
reached* 
Grid of analysis 
• Confirmability Case study protocol Careful selection of 
interview participants to 
include all relevant 
stakeholders 
Careful recording 
and storage of data 
Digital recordings 
Grid of analysis as 
common frame of 
reference between 
researchers 
Data audit for bias and 
distortion 
*Two of the authors analyzed 10 interview transcripts each and compared their respective analyses and additional themes in 
order to reach agreement and increase intercoder reliability, calculated at more than 70%, which is an acceptable level of 
agreement (Carey, Morgan, & Oxtoby, 1996). 100% agreement was then reached through discussions. 
Table 5: Power Relationships at the Dyadic Level 
Relationship Buyer Power Supplier Power Relationship Type 
B.F. – A1 HIGH LOW Buyer dominance 
B.F. – A1.1 HIGH LOW Buyer dominance 
B.F. – A2 HIGH MEDIUM Buyer dominance 
B.F. – A3 HIGH LOW Buyer dominance 
B.F. – A4 HIGH LOW Buyer dominance 
B.F. – A5 HIGH LOW Buyer dominance 
B.F. – A6 HIGH LOW Buyer dominance 
B.F. – B1 LOW HIGH Supplier Dominance 
B.F. – B2 MEDIUM HIGH Supplier dominance 
B.F. – C1 LOW HIGH Supplier Dominance 
B.F. – C2 HIGH LOW Buyer dominance 
 
Table 6: Dominant Relationship Types With Big Food 
Relationship 
Type 
Critical Themes  Illustrative Quotations 
BUYER 
DOMINANCE 
‐ Buyer represents high 
proportion of supplier’s 
A.2 “For crop A, there is nowhere else for them to go.” 
A.6 “The vast majority of crop A we grow are for BF.” 
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revenue 
‐ Lack of alternatives to 
supply 
‐ Captive supplier 
situation 
‐ Multiple suppliers 
available 
 
 
 
A.1 “We are sole suppliers, we are not supplying any other customer of 
A.” 
A.2 “I have never added up what capital is behind the thousands of tons 
that we supply, I don’t quite have a figure, but it’s millions and millions.” 
A.4 “BF regards a contract over a year as a liability.” 
B.F. “There have been some tense contract negotiations over the last few 
years.” 
C.2 “Our current business was initiated by BF about 8 or 9 years ago to 
provide a better avenue for their supply of crop C into the future.” 
“We used to supply 100% of crop C for the brand but then BF chose to 
have more suppliers because they felt that having one supplier wasn’t the 
most cost effective and least risky way.” 
“Most of their contracts are for short-term supply and they are reluctant 
to sign long-term agreements.” 
SUPPLIER 
DOMINANCE 
‐ Buyer represents small 
proportion of supplier’s 
revenue 
‐ Criticality of crops for 
buyer’s new product 
portfolio 
‐ Small number of 
suppliers for the crop 
‐ Lack of relationship 
specific investments 
from suppliers 
(flexibility) 
B.F. “In certain ways crop B suppliers are very tactical. They play the 
market. If the prices go up for something they will all go there, if prices 
go down…” 
“B is a crop you can go in and out, it doesn’t have the capital 
requirements of other crops. We have more of a battle in our hands to 
have these suppliers keep growing B.” 
B.1 “Because this area is a big producer of B, there has been an interest 
for B.F. to speak and trade with us.” 
“There are other commercial opportunities for us suppliers on the open 
market.” 
C.2 “From their point of view they want the security of supply because 
crop C is important for their economic viability.” 
“They are expanding their requirement of C because of their new product 
portfolio and their main priority is to safeguard future suppliers.” 
“The motivation to supply BF is very minimal because we aren’t in crop 
C for them. It just happens that BF is a useful way of selling the leftovers 
of crop C.” 
“The longer the contract, the bigger the risk to us as merchants.” 
 
Table 7: Horizontal Supplier–Supplier Relationships in the Different SCs 
 
General Description From 
Cases 
Buyer’s Strategic Intent 
Supplier–Supplier Relationship 
Characteristics Observed 
FOOD A 
Suppliers are 
geographically dispersed 
but organized in supplier 
groups. Group sizes and 
organization vary. Head of 
groups are the main points 
of contact for B.F. 
Exert competitive pressure 
between supplier groups to keep 
prices low, high quality, and 
stimulate compliance. 
Reduce supply and environmental 
risks by sourcing from multiple 
large suppliers in different 
regions. 
Stimulate performance and 
transparency around newly 
introduced environmental and 
social projects by having 
suppliers collaborate (e.g., 
supplier group training on carbon 
measurement tool). 
‐ Collaborative relationships and 
information sharing within groups 
‐ Some individual affinities across 
groups but limited amount of 
information sharing as proprietary 
information is viewed as competitive 
advantage 
‐ Head of groups are in charge of 
negotiating contracts for the group, 
passing down sustainability 
requirements, and managing the 
relationships between group suppliers. 
‐ Solidarity between suppliers around 
degrading quality of relationship and 
increasing requirements 
‐ Coopetitive relationships 
FOOD B 
Limited number of 
suppliers in two distinct 
geographical locations.  
Reduce supply and environmental 
risks by sourcing from two main 
supplier groups in separate 
regions. 
Increase performance by making 
the two main suppliers compete to 
supply the most environmentally 
efficient farm-to-factory services. 
‐ Limited interaction between supplier 
groups 
‐ Cordial relationships between supplier 
groups as perception of being different 
types of suppliers (complementary) 
‐ Transparency within supplier groups 
but no information sharing between 
groups 
‐ Primarily competitive relationship 
FOOD C 
One dedicated supplier and 
other ad hoc suppliers 
selling leftover supplies of 
C that couldn’t be sold to 
Reduce costs of sustainability by 
tapping into suppliers’ previous 
experience and certifications 
acquired for other buyers. 
‐ Knowledge of identity of other 
suppliers but no interaction 
‐ C2 negatively perceive other suppliers 
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retailers. Limited continuity 
of supply base except for 
C2. 
Stimulate competition between 
C2 and other suppliers to get 
better prices and reduce risks. 
‐ Minimal explicit information sharing 
‐ Competitive relationship 
